Resupply at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu

This is a case -study examination of operations characterized as small separated unit operations with great strategic significance without the benefit of secure ground lines of communication linked to secure support bases. The paper looks specifically at the battle of Dien Bien Phu during the French-Indochina War of 1946 to 1954 and the battle of Khe Sanh during the second Indochina War in 1967. These battles had decisive strategic implications, which affected the conduct of the war. The paper focuses on the French failure at Dien Bien Phu to logistically support a viable strategy for winning the war or specifically this battle which in defeat undermined any effort of the French to win the war against the Vietminh. French logistical errors in planning or lack of concern for the logistical aspect of the operation, ensured their defeat. These logistical shortfalls at Dien Bien Phu provided an opportunity for the United States Military to learn from this operation and incorporate the lessons learned into future applications of airborne operations and training. The standard of measurement in determining if the United States learned from the logistical shortfalls at Dien Bien Phu began with the support effort at Khe Sanh and in the Airborne operations conducted by the United States since Khe Sanh. Studying the lessons of these two battles and their impact on national strategy are applicable to Army Transformation and will add to the professional growth and understanding of future United States Army War College students and other interested military officers and strategists.